Nervos 想让智能合约平台实现「价值存储」的经济模型究竟是什么?

NervosNetwork 2019-03-09

原文标题:《Nervos CKB 经济模型提案正式发布》

今天,Nervos 联合创始人及研究员 Kevin Wang 在 GitHub 上提交了 CKB 经济模型提案 《Crypto-Economics for the Nervos Common Knowledge Base》。

区块链是加密算法和经济学的奇妙融合,由此产生了一个新的研究领域,即加密经济学。这个领域现在还处在早期。Nervos Network 的目标是为下一代的基于密码学保护的加密经济生态建设基础设施,生态中会有不同角色来承担不同的功能,上至上层应用,下至底层网络,俨然成为一个整体。

一个好的加密经济设计就如同设计一个复杂的社会体系,它能够使得体系中不同角色分工协作。而加密经济的意义在于能够对不同角色进行恰当的激励,实现激励相容,促进生态良性循环。

在 CKB 经济模型设计中,我们讨论了比特币和以以太坊为代表的智能合约平台,根据它们的经济模型设计,提出了 CKB 经济模型设计的目标,并针对这些目标提出了我们的解决方案。

大家可能不了解 RFC 是什么?RFC 是 Request for Comments (意见征求)的缩写,它的建立是为新协议的改善和最佳实践提供一个开放的社区驱动路径。就像以太坊有 EIP (以太坊改进提案),比特币有 BIP,而我们希望在 Nervos 项目成立之初就 建立完善的社区提案、讨论以及实施流程 。在过去的一年中,分散在世界各地的小伙伴因为 RFC,顺利地参与到我们项目的立项、代码开源,现在的经济模型,甚至未来的测试网络中来。在 GitHub 上,每天都会产生非常多的 Issue /PR (Pull Request)讨论。

我们将我们对技术的沉淀,对经济的思考,以及对整个行业的探索,通过 RFC 的方式提交到 GitHub 上。当然,我们也会有我们的局限性,一个完善的加密经济设计,需要汇聚更多社区成员的智慧。因此,我们希望有更多的小伙伴加入进来,和我们共同完善这份提案。你的每一个宝贵意见,都会推动 Nervos 的成长,甚至推动整个行业的进步!

在 CKB 经济模型将近一年的研究过程中,有许多行业内的专家与朋友深入参与了讨论,提出了大量宝贵的意见和改进建议,在此,我们向各位老师表示衷心的感谢:

  • 哈佛大学梅森学者 邹传伟 老师
  • 乔治梅森大学金融系助理教授 李家荪 教授
  • 北京大学前沿计算研究中心 邓小铁 教授

Nervos Team
2019.3.9
以下为 Nervos 经济模型中英文对照全文:

1. 代币经济学的设计目标

Public permission-less blockchains are open and distributed systems with diverse groups of participants. A well designed crypto-economics model is to provide incentives so that participants’ pursuit of own economic interests leads to desired emergent behaviors in alignment with the protocol, to contribute to the blockchain network’s success.

公有非许可链是开放给所有人自由参与的分布式系统。一个精心设计的加密经济模型,可以将各方参与者的利益与协议的整体利益对齐 , 使其在追求自身经济利益的同时也能对整个区块链网络做出贡献。

More specifically, the design of a crypto-economic system has to provide answers to the following questions:

1.How can the economic model ensure the security of the protocol? 
2.How can the economic model ensure long term sustainability of the protocol? 
3.How can the economic model align the objectives of different actors to grow the value of the protocol network? 

更具体地说,加密经济系统的设计必须回答以下问题: 

  1. 经济模型如何保障协议的安全性?
  2. 经济模式如何维护协议的可持续性?
  3. 经济模型如何将不同参与者的经济目标与提高整个网络价值的目标对齐 ?

2. 比特币的加密经济模型

The Bitcoin protocol uses its native currency to incentivize miners to validate and produce blocks. The Nakamoto Consensus considers the longest chain as the valid chain, which encourages block producing miners to propagate new blocks as soon as they produce them, validate blocks as soon as they receive them to have the whole network achieve consensus on the global state.

比特币协议使用原生代币激励矿工验证交易和挖矿。Nakamoto 共识遵循最长链原则,以此激励矿工在挖出新块后立即广播,在收到新块后立即验证,以达成全网共识。

The native tokens of the Bitcoin network function both as a utility token and an asset. When bitcoins function as a utility, they can be used to pay transaction fees; when they function as an asset, they can be used to preserve value over time. Those two use cases are often referred to as the “Medium of Exchange” (MoE) use case and the “Store of Value” (SoV) use case. The two use cases are not mutually exclusive. They are both important for the network to function. However, it’s important to study the economic motives of the users of both use cases as a guide to analyze the sustainability of the Bitcoin network.

比特币的原生代币既是功能代币,也是储值资产。当比特币作为功能代币时,可用于支付交易费用,当作为储值资产时,可用来保存价值。通常我们用术语 MoE (Medium of Exchange, 交易媒介) 和 SoV (Store of Value, 价值存储) 分别指代这两种用途。MoE 和 SoV 的功能并不冲突,它们对比特币网络的正常运行都发挥着重要的作用,研究这两种用途的经济动机对分析比特币网络的可持续性具有重要的指导意义。

The Bitcoin protocol constraints the network’s transaction throughput with a fixed block size. Users bid with fees on the limited throughput to have their transactions processed. With this auction like mechanism, transaction fees are determined by the transaction demand - the more demand there is on the network, the higher the transaction fee a user has to pay to beat the competition to have their transaction included.

在比特币协议中,对区块大小的限制制约了整个网络的交易处理能力,用户需要通过类似拍卖的机制竞争有限的交易处理资源。拍卖价格也就是交易费由实际的交易需求决定,当交易需求增加时,为了击败竞拍对手,交易费的价格也会水涨船高。

2.1 比特币作为交易媒介网络

The Medium of Exchange use case views the Bitcoin network primarily as a peer to peer value transfer network. MoE users don’t have to hold bitcoins to benefit from the network - it’s the transactions in themselves that provide value. In fact, there are specialized Bitcoin payment services to provide access to liquidity and allow senders and receivers to acquire and dispose of Bitcoins just in time to perform the value transfer, without having to hold the cryptocurrency. MoE users are not concerned with price, or the movement of price, but care about the fiat equivalent cost of the transaction fees.

MoE 用户将比特币网络看作一个点对点的价值传输网络,他们不通过持有比特币获益,而是利用比特币网络的点对点交易功能受益。事实上,已经有专业的比特币支付服务商提供这种资金流动性服务,用户不需要持有加密货币也可以将比特币作为价值载体完成交易。MoE 用户并不关心加密货币的价格和价格波动,他们只关心交易费用换算成法币后的价格。

It’s challenging for Bitcoin to become a dominant MoE network. If the protocol calibrates its block time and the block size, therefore fixing the supply of transactions, the success of the network will necessarily increase the cost of transactions, reducing its competitiveness among other similar purposed blockchains as well as its own forks; If the protocol aims to keep the transaction cost low and increase the supply of transactions with faster block time or bigger blocks, it could compromise both security and decentralization through higher fork rate and increased cost of consensus participation.

比特币要成为一个 MoE 主导的网络是很有挑战性的。如果协议限制了出块时间和区块大小,那么网络的交易处理能力会非常受限,因此网络的繁荣必然会导致交易成本增加,而这将反过来降低网络的竞争力,这种情况也存在于其他类似的区块链协议以及比特币分叉链中。如果协议致力于维持较低的交易成本,通过设置更快的出块时间或更大的区块大小来提高交易处理能力,这会导致更频繁的分叉或者更高的参与共识成本,实际上这相当于在去中心化与安全性上做了妥协。

2.2 比特币作为价值存储的网络

Store of Value users view the Bitcoin network as a protocol to provide security to its native cryptocurrency as an asset that can preserve value over time. They see the Medium of Exchange use case as the necessary function to go in and out of this asset. A store of value user, especially the ones who hold the cryptocurrency for a long time, doesn’t care much about the transaction cost, as they can amortize it over time. They do care about the value of a Bitcoin, which depends on the network’s security and decentralization - if the network becomes less secure and can be attacked easily, it’ll stop being perceived as a store of value and the tokens will lose value; if the network becomes centralized, Bitcoin as an asset no longer has independent value, but has to assume counter-party risk.

而 SoV 用户则将比特币网络看作一种为原生代币提供安全保障的协议,他们相信原生代币可以长期保值,而 MoE 是一种不可或缺的功能。SoV 用户,特别是长期持币者,并不在乎交易成本,因为交易成本会随着持有时间的累积被摊薄。SoV 用户关注的是比特币本身的价值,而这依赖于网络的安全性和去中心化程度 - 如果网络不够安全,攻击很容易,那么价值将无法被储存,比特币也将一文不值 ; 如果网络算力过于集中,比特币作为一种资产不再具有独立价值,并将面临保管方风险。

For Bitcoin to succeed as a SoV network, it has to continue to keep its monetary policy stable and its network secure and decentralized. However, Bitcoin’s monetary policy has a hard cap, and after all the coins are mined, the network can only pay for the miners with transaction fees. It’s still an open question whether this model could be sustainable, especially considering Store of Value networks themselves tend not to produce many transactions.

如果比特币要成为一个 SoV 主导的网络,其必须继续坚持当前的货币政策,维护网络的安全性以及保持一定程度的去中心化。然而,比特币的发行总量有限,当所有的比特币被开采一空后,给矿工的激励只剩下交易费。这种模式是否可持续仍然是一个问号,特别是在一个 SoV 主导的网络里往往不会产生许多交易。

2.3 谁能长期补贴矿工?

Security and decentralization are two essential properties of a blockchain network, and they come with a high cost that has to be paid to the operators of the network. Bitcoin’s current model has network security entirely paid with transaction fees after all the coins are mined. However, the MoE users have very limited time exposure to the network’s security risk, therefore won’t be willing to pay for it; the SoV users have prolonged exposure to the network’s security risk and are willing to pay for it, but they produce nearly no transactions.

安全性和去中心化是区块链网络的两个基本属性,维护这两个属性需要付出很高的成本,因此支付给网络维护者 (主要是矿工) 的奖励必须能够覆盖这些成本。根据比特币当前的模型,当代币开采完毕后,如果矿工仍可赚取足够的交易费,那么比特币网络依然保有安全性。 SoV 用户长期承受网络的安全风险,因此他们会愿意支付高额的交易费,可是他们几乎不产生交易。

Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism incentivize miners to recognize the longest chain as the network’s canonical state. Miner’s ongoing supply of hashing power doesn’t only provide security for the current block, but the immutability of all the blocks before it on the canonical chain. Relying on the SoV users to make one time payments for the ongoing security protection they receive from miners is not sustainable.

比特币的共识机制激励矿工去识别并验证最长的链。矿工持续投入的算力不只为最新的区块提供了安全性,也维护了之前所有区块的不可篡改性。仅靠 SoV 用户的一次性付款让矿工持续提供安全保障非长久之策。

In a SoV network, relying on inflation to fund network security is more incentive compatible with the users. Inflation based block reward mechanism represents indirect payment from the beneficiary of the network’s ongoing security to the provider of such security, in proportion to the duration that enjoy the service.

而在 SoV 网络中,如果依靠通胀来为网络安全提供资金对矿工的激励更持久,对用户也更友好。基于通胀的区块奖励暗含用户间接地向安全提供者支付费用,并且费用多少与其享受安全服务的时间成正比。

3. 可保值和交易的智能合约平台

Smart contract platforms like Ethereum come with Turing-complete programmability and can support a much wider variety of use cases. The native tokens are typically used to price and pay for the cost of decentralized computation. Like the Bitcoin network, smart contract platforms also have the dual functions of preserving value and performing transactions. They differ from the payment networks in that the value they preserve is not only their own native tokens, but also the internal states of decentralized applications, for example, crypto-assets ownership in ERC20 smart contracts.

像以太坊这样的智能合约平台具有图灵完备的可编程性,可以支持更多的应用场景。原生代币通常用于为去中心化的计算服务定价和费用支付。与比特币网络一样,智能合约平台也具有资产保值和交易媒介的双重功能。它们与纯支付网络的不同之处在于,它们保存的价值不仅仅是它们自己的原生代币,还包括去中心化应用的内部状态,例如在 ERC20 智能合约里的加密资产。

Another significant difference is that transactions on smart contract platforms are much more “portable”. It’s much easier to take advantage of the more advanced scripting capability of smart contract platforms, to develop interoperability protocols to move transactions to a more cost effective transactional blockchain and securely settle back to the main “system of record” blockchains.

另一个与支付网络的重大区别是智能合约平台上的交易更加「便携」。利用智能合约平台更高级的脚本优势来开发交互协议,将交易转移到更具成本效益的子链上,并安全地将数据取回主链,现在是更容易了。

The economic models of smart contract platforms face similar polarization tendency of payment networks - With their superior interoperable capabilities, smart contract platforms are going to be even more specialized into transactional platforms and preservation platforms. Economically, this bifurcation comes from the fact that the two use cases have different ways of utilizing system resources - transactions consume instantaneous but renewable computation and bandwidth resources, and preservation requires long term occupation of the global state. An economic model optimized for one is unlikely to be optimal for the other.

智能合约平台的经济模型面临着类似支付网络的两极化趋势 - 由于其良好的交互能力,智能合约平台要么偏向「交易平台」, 要么偏向「保值平台」。在经济上,这种分歧源自这样的事实:这两种「平台」具有不同的系统资源利用方式,处理交易消耗的计算和带宽是瞬时的,而且这两种资源是可再生的,但是保值却需要长期占用全球共识状态。为一个方向进行优化的经济模型不太可能是另一个方向的最佳选择。

Competitive transactional platforms need to prioritize for low transaction cost . Transactional users are willing to accept less-optimal security, because of their only moment-in-time, limited exposure to security risk. They’re willing to accept the possibility of censored transactions, as long as there are options to take their transactions elsewhere. A transactional platform that invests in either security or censorship resistance will have higher cost of transactions, reflected either with higher transaction fees or high capital cost for stakes in a “stake for access” model, making the network less competitive.

有竞争力的交易平台需要优先考虑降低交易成本。MoE 用户可以接受不太理想的安全性,因为他们只在有限的时间内暴露在危险之中。他们可以接受交易审查的可能性,大不了去其他地方进行交易。致力于提高安全性或抗审查性的交易平台将付出更高的交易成本,这将导致更高的交易费或者在”stake for access”模型中付出更高的资金成本,这都会使得这个交易网络的竞争力下降。

This is especially true when a well designed inter-blockchain protocol can allow trust-less state transfers and fraud repudiation of transactions. We already can see examples of transactional users prioritizing cost over security in centralized crypto-asset exchanges and not-so-decentralized blockchains - despite their flaws, they’re still popular because of their transactional efficiency.

当设计良好的跨链协议可以允许无信任的状态转移与抗交易作恶时,这样的状况就更明显了。我们已经可以看到很多的例子反映了 MoE 用户会优先考虑低成本的手续费而不是更高的安全性,他们往往选择在中心化的交易所和没那么去中心化的区块链上交易。尽管这些网络环境存在安全缺陷,但由于交易效率的原因,它们仍然很受欢迎。

Competitive preservation platforms need to be sustainably secure and censorship resistant. It requires an economic model designed not around transactions that happen moment-in-time, but around the ongoing occupation of the global state, and have users pay for the network infrastructure metered in their consumption of this critical resource.

但是,有竞争力的保值平台需要具有可持续的安全性和抗审查性。因此需要设计一种不是基于即时交易而是基于对世界状态的占用而设计的经济模型,让用户为网络基础设施的关键资源的消耗付费。

4. 资产存储

One of the most important use cases for smart contract platforms is to issue tokens to represent ownership of assets. These crypto-assets can have their own communities and markets, and their values are independent from the value of their platform tokens. On the other hand, these assets depend on the platform to process transactions and provide security. Payment networks like Bitcoin can be seen as single asset platforms, where smart contract platforms are multi-asset platforms. Similar to the concept of “Store of Value” in the context of Bitcoin, we call the utility that smart contract platforms preserve the value of its crypto-assets “Store of Assets”.

智能合约平台最重要的用例之一是发行代币来代表资产的所有权。这些加密资产可以拥有自己的社区和市场,其价值与平台代币的价值是独立的。在另一方面,这些资产依赖于平台来处理交易并提供安全性。像比特币这样的支付网络可以被视为单一资产平台,而智能合约平台则是多资产平台。与比特币背景下的「价值存储」概念类似,我们称智能合约平台的功能是可以保留其加密资产「资产存储」的价值。

Preservation focused smart contract platforms must have a Store of Assets token economics design. The level of platform security has to grow along with the asset value it preserves. Otherwise as asset value grows, it will be increasingly profitable to “double-spend” assets by attacking the consensus process of the platform.

以保存资产为重点的智能合约平台,必须具有「资产存储」的代币经济设计。平台安全级别必须与平台上加密资产的价值一起增长。否则随着平台上加密资产价值的增长,因为攻击的利益会增长,平台本身遭到「双重花费攻击」的可能性会大大增加。

None of the current smart contract platforms are designed as Store of Assets platforms. Their token economics are designed either to facilitate transactions (for example, Ethereum’s native tokens are to pay for the decentralized computation) or to fulfill staking requirements. In either case, the growth in asset value doesn’t necessarily raise miner’s income to provide more security.

目前的智能合约平台都不是为了「资产存储」平台而设计的。这些平台的代币经济学旨在促进交易(例如,以太坊的原生代币用于支付去中心化计算的费用)或满足权益证明的要求。在任何一种情况下,资产价值的增长并不一定会提高矿工的收入,而事实是只有确保矿工的持续高收入才能矿工持续投入,从而使得平台获得更多的安全保障。

Every multi-asset platform is an ecosystem of independent projects. The security of the platform can be seen as “public goods” that benefit all projects. To make the ecosystem sustainable from a security point of view, there has to be a clear mechanism that the platform captures the economic success of the ecosystem to raise its own level of security. In other words, a Store of Assets platform has to be able to translate the demand of crypto-assets to the revenue of its miners, often through raising the value of the native tokens that miners are compensated in.

每个多资产平台都是独立的生态系统。平台的安全性可被视为有益于所有项目的「公用物品」。为了从安全的角度使得生态系统可持续发展,必须有一个明确的机制,即该平台需要能够捕捉到平台上生态系统的成功,以同时提高其自身的安全水平。换句话说,「资产存储」平台必须能将对加密资产的需求转化为其矿工的收入,通常是通过提高对矿工的补偿,让其获得额外的原生代币。

Otherwise, the platform’s level of security becomes the ceiling how valuable the assets can become. When the value of an asset rises such that typical transactions can no longer be sufficiently protected by the platform, the liquidity would dry up and demand on the asset will fade.

否则,平台的安全水平会成为加密资产价值的上限。当资产价值上升,使得平台不再能够充分保护在平台上的交易时,流动性就会枯竭,对资产的需求也会减少。

Decentralized multi-assets smart contract platforms have to be Store of Assets to be sustainable.

去中心化的多资产智能合约平台必须持续的做好「资产存储」的功能。

5. 去中心化与状态限制的需求

Like other long term store of value systems, a Store of Assets platform has to be neutral and free of risks of censorship and confiscation. These are the properties that made gold the world’s favorite the store of value for thousands of years. For open, permission-less blockchain networks, censorship resistance comes down to having the broadest consensus scope with a low barrier for consensus and full node participation. Comparing to payment networks, running a full node for a smart contract system is more resource intensive, therefore a Store of Assets platform has to take measures to protect the operating cost of full nodes to keep the network sufficiently decentralized.

与其他长期价值存储的系统一样,「资产存储」平台必须保持中立,并且没有审查和充公的风险。这些条件使得黄金成为世界上数千年来最受欢迎的价值存储。对于完全开放无须许可的区块链网络,抗审查的能力主要来自于最广泛的全球共识,并且让全节点参与的门槛足够的低。与支付网络相比,智能合约平台运行全节点需要更密集的资源,因此,「资产存储」平台必须采取措施来保持全节点的运营成本,以保持网络有足够的去中心化。

Both Bitcoin and Ethereum throttle transaction throughput to make sure participation is not limited to only “super computers” - Bitcoin throttles on bandwidth and Ethereum throttles on computation. However, they haven’t taken effective measures to contain the ever growing global state necessary for consensus participation and independent transaction validation. This is especially a centralization force for high throughout smart contract platforms, where the global state grows even faster.

比特币和以太坊都限制了交易吞吐量以确保参与方不仅只有「超级计算机」 - 比特币限制带宽,以太网限制计算能力。然而,他们没有采取有效的方式,来容纳共识参与和交易验证所需而且不断增长的全球状态。尤其是整个智能合约平台有着高度集中的需求,全球状态的增长速度只会更快。

In Bitcoin, the global state is the UTXO set. Bitcoin doesn’t control the growth of the size of the UTXOs directly, but every new UTXO adds overhead to the transaction where it’s created, making the transaction more expensive.

在比特币中,全局状态是 UTXO 的集合。比特币不会直接控制 UTXO 大小的增长,但每个新增的 UTXO 都会增加交易费用。

In Ethereum, the global state is represented with the EVM’s state trie, the data structure that contains the balances and internal states of all accounts. When new accounts or new contract values are created, the size of the global state expands. Ethereum charges fixed amounts of Gas for inserting new values into its state storage and offers fixed amounts of Gas as transaction refund when values are removed. Ethereum’s approach is a step in the right direction, but still has several issues:

在以太坊中,全局状态由 EVM 的状态树来表示,该状态是包含所有帐户的余额和内部状态的数据结构。创建新帐户或新的智能合约值时,全球状态的大小就会增加。以太坊收取固定的 Gas 费用用于存入新的数据,并在移除数据的时后提供固定数量的 Gas 作为交易退款。以太坊的方法是朝着正确方向迈出的一步,但仍有几个问题:

  • the growth of the global state is not bounded in any way and can grow infinitely, therefore there’s no certainty in the cost of full node participation
  • the system raises one-time revenue for expanding the state storage, but miners and full nodes have to bear the expense of storage over time
  • there’s no obvious reason why the cost of expanding storage should be priced in fixed Gas amounts, which is used to price a unit of computation
  • the “pay once, occupy forever” state storage model gives very little incentive for users to voluntarily clear state and reduce the size of global state
  • 全球状态的增长不受任何限制,并且可以无限增长,因此全节点的参与成本并不确定
  • 该系统为扩大状态存储提高了一次性收费,但矿工和全节点必须承担长期存储费用
  • 没有明显的理由说明为什么扩展存储的成本应该以固定的 Gas 定价(Gas 用于计算一个单位的计算费用)
  • 「一次性支付,永远占用」的状态存储模型的激励很小,很难让用户自愿清除状态和减少全球状态的占用

The Ethereum community is actively working on this problem, and the leading solution is to charge smart contract “state rent” - contracts have to periodically pay fees based on the size of its state. If the rent is not paid, the contract goes to “hibernation” and not accessible before the payment is current again. We see several difficult-to-solve problems with this approach:

以太坊社区正在积极解决这个问题,领先的解决方案是收取智能合约的「状态租金」 - 合约必须根据其状态占用的大小来定期支付费用。如果没有支付租金,合同将会进入「休眠状态」,并且在支付租金之前无法访问。我们看到这种方法有几个难以解决的问题:

  • many contracts, especially popular ERC20 contracts, represent decentralized communities and express asset ownership of many users. It’s a difficult problem to coordinate all the users to pay for state rent in a fair and efficient way.
  • even a contract is current on its rent payment, it still may not be fully functional because some of its dependent contracts may be behind on their payments.
  • the user experience for contracts with state rent is sub-optimal
    We believe a well designed mechanism to regulate the state storage has to be able to achieve the following goals:
  • 许多合约,特别是流行的 ERC20 合约,代表了分散的社区,并代表了许多用户的资产所有权。协调所有用户以公平并且有效率的方式支付租金是一个很难的问题。
  • 即使一个合约的租金是已支付的状态,它仍然可能无法运作顺利,因为其他需要调用的合约可能还没付款。
  • 使用状态租赁的合约是次等的用户体验。
    我们认为,一个精心设计的状态存储机制必须能够实现以下目标:
  • the growth of the global state has to be bounded to give predictability for full node participation. Ideally, the cost is well within the range of non-professional participants to keep the network maximally decentralized and censorship resistant.
  • with bounded growth of the global state, the price for expanding it and the rewards for reducing it should be determined by the market. In particular, it’s desirable to have the cost of expanding state storage higher when it’s mostly full, and lower when it’s mostly empty.
  • the system has to be able to continuously raise revenue from its state users to pay miners for providing this resource. This serves both purposes of balancing miner’s economics and providing incentives for users to clear unnecessary states sooner than later.
  • 必须限制全球状态的增长,以便为全节点参与是在可预测的状况下。理想情况下,成本能控制在非专业参与者可以负担的范围内,以保持网络最大程度的去中心化与抗审查。
  • 随着全球状态的有限增长,价格的上升与降低将由市场决定。特别是当状态存储空间快满的时后,需要将状态存储的成本提高,而当它大部分为空时,需要降低成本,这是非常吸引人的。
  • 系统需要能够不断提高其状态用户的费用,以支付矿工提供这种资源。这有助于平衡矿工的经济收入,同时让用户被激励去清除不必要的状态。

Just like how Bitcoin throttles and forces pricing on bandwidth, and Ethereum throttles and forces pricing on computation, to keep a blockchain network long term decentralized and sustainable, we have to come up with a way to constrain and price the global state. This is especially important for preservation focused, Store of Assets networks, where usage of the network is not about transactions that mostly happen off-chain, but the cost of ongoing occupation of the global state.

就像比特币如何限制带宽,以及以太坊限制计算的定价,来保持区块链网络长期去中心化和可持续,我们必须提出一种约束与全球状态的定价方法。这对于以保护资产为重点的「资产存储」平台来说,这是特别重要的,(其中对于网络中的交易使用不总是发生在线下),而是持续占用全球状态的成本。

6. Nervos CKB 的经济模型

The Nervos Common Knowledge Base (Nervos CKB for short) is a preservation focused, “Store of Assets” blockchain. Architecturally, it’s designed to best support on-chain state and off-chain computation; economically, it’s designed to provide sustainable security and decentralization. Nervos CKB is the base layer of the overall Nervos Network.

Nervos Common Knowledge Base (简称 Nervos CKB)是一个以保存价值为重点的「资产存储」区块链。在架构上,是为了要最好地支持链上的状态和链外计算。在经济上,是为了要提供可持续的安全性和去中心化。 Nervos CKB 是整个网络的基础层。

6.1 原生代币

The native token for the Nervos CKB is the “Common Knowledge Byte”, or “CK Byte” for short. The CK Bytes represent cell capacity in bytes and they give owners the ability to occupy a piece of the blockchain’s overall global state. For example, if Alice owns 1000 CK Bytes, she can create a cell with 1000 bytes in capacity, or multiple cells that add up to 1000 bytes in capacity. She can use the 1000 bytes to store assets, application state, or other types of common knowledge.

Nervos CKB 的原生代币是 「Common Knowledge Byte」,简称「CK Byte」。 CK Byte 代表 Cell 空间,它们让拥有者能够占用区块链的全球状态。例如,如果 Alice 拥有 1000 个 CK Byte,她可以创建一个空间为 1000 Byte 的单元,或者空间合计最多为 1000 Byte 的多个 Cell。她可以使用 1000 个 Byte 来存储资产,App 状态或是其他类型的数据资料。

6.2 代币发行政策

There are two types of native token issuance. The “base issuance” has a finite total supply with a Bitcoin like issuance schedule - the number of base issuance halves approximately every 4 years until all the base issuance tokens are mined out. All base issuance tokens are rewarded to the miners as incentives to protect the network.

The “secondary issuance” is designed to collect state rent, and has issuance rate that’s constant over time. After base issuance stops, there will only be secondary issuance.

有两种类型的原生代币发行政策。 「基础发行」的总供给量有限,发行时间表与比特币类似 - 基本发行数量大约每 4 年减半一次,直到所有「基础发行」的代币被挖出来。所有「基础发行」代币都会奖励给矿工,作为保护网络的激励措施。

「二级发行」的设计则是为了收取状态租金,每年的发行数量是不变的。「基础发行」停止后,「二级发行」仍会继续。

6.3 收取二级发行的状态租金和 NervosDAO 设计

Since the native tokens represent right to expand the global state, the issuance policy of the natives tokens bounds the state growth. As state storage is bounded and becomes a scarce resource like bandwidth in Bitcoin and computation throughput in Ethereum, they can be market priced and traded. State rent adds the necessary time dimension to the fee structure of state storage occupation. Instead of mandating periodic rent payments, we use a two step approach as a “targeted inflation” scheme to collect this rent:

由于原生代币代表了占用全球状态的权利,所以代币发行政策会限制状态的增长。由于状态存储受限制并且成为了稀缺资源,就好比比特币的带宽和以太坊的计算吞吐量,它们可以在市场上被定价和交易。状态租金在状态占用的费用结构上,增加了必要的时间维度。我们采用两个步骤作为「目标通胀」框架来收取这笔租金,而不是强制定期收取租金:

  • On top of the base issuance, we add the secondary issuance which can be seen as “inflation tax” to all existing token holders. For users who use their CK Bytes to store state, this recurring inflation tax is how they pay state rent to the miners.
  • However, we have also collected rent from the CK Bytes that are not used to store state, and we need to return to them what we collected. We allow those users to deposit and lock their native tokens into a special contract called the NervosDAO. The NervosDAO receives part of the “secondary issuance” to make up for the otherwise unfair dilution.
  • 在「基础发行」的基础上,我们添加了「二次发行」,可以将其视为对所有代币持有者的「通胀税」。对于使用 CK Byte 存储状态的用户,这种定期的通胀税是他们向矿工支付状态租金的方式。
  • 然而,由于我们对于那些没有使用 CK Byte 存储状态的所有者也收取了租金,所以我们需要将租金归还。我们允许这些用户将他们的原生代币存入并锁定到一个特殊合约中,我们称它为 NervosDAO。 NervosDAO 将接受部分「二级发行」的补偿,以弥补因为不公平造成的稀释。

Let’s suppose at the time of a secondary issuance event, 60% of all CK Bytes are used to store state, 35% of all CK Bytes are deposited and locked in the NervosDAO, and 5% of all CK Bytes are kept liquid. Then 60% of the secondary issuance goes to the miners, 35% of the issuance goes to the NervosDAO to be distributed to the locked tokens proportionally, and 5% of the tokens are burned.

假设在「二级发行」时,所有 CK Byte 的 60% 用于存储状态,所有 CK Byte 的 35% 被存放并锁定在 NervosDAO 的合约中,剩下的 CK Byte 中的 5% 保持流动性。那每次进行二级发行出块奖励的时候,60% 的「二级发行」会奖励给矿工,35% 的会进入 NervosDAO 按比例分配给锁定的代币(用户),最后剩下的 5% 会被销毁。

For long term token holders, as long as they lock their tokens in the NervosDAO, the inflationary effect of secondary issuance is only nominal. For them it’s as if the secondary issuance doesn’t exist and they’re holding hard-capped tokens like Bitcoin.

对于长期代币的持有者,只要他们将代币锁定在 NervosDAO 合约中,「二次发行」的通胀效应只是名义上的。对他们而言,就像二次发行不存在一样,他们持有的代币,就会像比特币这样有硬顶的设计。

6.4 矿工补偿

Miners are compensated with both block rewards and transaction fees. They receive all of the base issuance, and part of the secondary issuance. In the long term when base issuance stops, miners still receive state rent income that’s independent of transactions but tied to the adoption of the common knowledge base.

矿工会获得两种出块奖励和交易手续费。他们将会收到所有的「基本发行」,以及部分的「二级发行」。长期来看,当「基础发行」停止后,矿工仍然可以获得状态租赁的收入。

6.5 交易手续费支付

A decentralized blockchain network’s transaction capacity is always limited and its resources are constrained. Transaction fees serve the dual purposes of establishing a market for the limited transaction capacity and as protection against spams. In Bitcoin, transaction fees are expressed with the difference between the outputs and inputs; In Ethereum, processing transactions requires miners to perform computations that can’t be estimated efficiently, therefore transaction fees are expressed as cost of unit of computation or as “gas price”. Ethereum transactions include both properties of “gas price” and “gas limit”, and the real transaction fee is multiplied by amount of gas used, up to the specified .

去中心化区块链网络的交易吞吐量是有限的,其资源是受到限制的。交易手续费有两个目的,一个是为了有限的交易吞吐量建立一个市场,另一个则是防止恶意大量攻击。在比特币中,交易手续费表现在输出和输入之间的差异,而在以太坊中,处理交易需要矿工执行无法有效估算的计算,因此交易手续费表现为计算的单位成本或「gas price」。以太坊交易包括 gas price 和 gas limit 的属性,实际交易费用是 gasPrice 乘以使用的 gas 量,但不会超过上限的 gasLimit。

To ensure decentralization, the Nervos CKB restricts both computation and bandwidth throughput, effectively making it an auction for users use those system resources. When submitting a transaction, the user can leave the total input cell capacities exceeding the total output cell capacities, leaving the difference as transaction fees expressed in the native tokens, payable to the miner that creates the block containing the transaction.

为了确保去中心化,Nervos CKB 限制了计算和带宽的吞吐量,当用户要使用这些系统资源时,它可以有效地成为一个拍卖市场。当用户提交交易时,提交的总输入需超过总输出的 Cell,将其差值作为以原生代币来支付的交易费用,支付给打包交易的出块矿工。

The number of units of computation (called “cycles”) also needs to be submitted as part of the transaction. Nervos CKB is an “off-chain computation, on-chain verification” platform, therefore the cycles of computation are known by the client who submits the transaction. When producing blocks, miners order transactions based on both transaction fees and the number of computation cycles necessary for transaction validation, maximizing its per-computation-cycle income within the computation and bandwidth throughput restrictions.

计算的单位数量(计算循环数)也需要作为交易的一部分来提交。 Nervos CKB 是一种「链下计算,链上验证」的平台,因此提交交易的客户端知道计算循环数。在出块时,矿工根据交易费用和交易验证所需的计算循环来制订这个交易,最大化每一个计算循环数和带宽吞吐量限制内的收入。

In the Nervos CKB, the transaction fees can be paid with the native tokens, user defined tokens or a combination of both.

在 Nervos CKB 中,可以使用原生代币,或者「用户自定义代币」来支付交易手续费,而两种的结合也可以用来支付手续费。

6.6 使用「用户自定义代币 UDT」支付交易手续费

Users are also free to user other tokens (for example, stable coins) to pay transactions fees, a concept known as “Economic Abstraction”. Note that even without explicit protocol support, it’s always possible to have users make arrangements with miners to pay transaction fees in other tokens outside of the protocol. This is often seen as a threat for many platforms - if the platform’s native tokens are purely to facilitate transactions, this would take away its intrinsic value and cause a collapse.

用户还可以自由地发行其他代币,例如稳定币,用来支付交易费用,这个概念是一种「经济抽象」。即使没有明确的协议支持,用户总是可以与矿工自行安排使用在协议之外的代币支付交易手续费。这通常被许多平台视为一种威胁 - 如果平台的原生代币纯粹是为了促进交易,这将剥夺其系统的内在价值,并进一步导致崩溃。

With the Nervos CKB, we embrace economic abstraction and the benefits it brings. Since the intrinsic value of the native tokens is based not on transaction payment, economic abstraction doesn’t pose a threat to the stability of our economic model. We do expect, however, the native tokens themselves are going to be the payment method of choice for vast majority of users and use cases - the native tokens are going to the most widely held tokens in the Nervos ecosystem, and everyone who owns assets necessarily owns the Nervos natives tokens as state storage capacity that the assets occupy.

通过 Nervos CKB,我们拥抱经济抽象以及其带来的好处。由于原生代币的内在价值不是基于支付手续费的,因此经济抽象不会让我们的经济模型造成威胁。然而,我们确实希望原生代币将成为绝大多数用户和应用的首选支付方式 - 原生代币将会成为 Nervos 生态系统中最广泛持有的代币,因为每个拥有资产的人都必须拥有 Nervos 的原生代币,原生代币对应的是状态的存储空间,因为资产本身也占有了一定的存储空间。

7. 用于保存价值的经济模型

The economic model of the Nervos CKB is designed specifically to preserve assets and other types of common knowledge. Let’s bring back the 3 high level design goals and examine our design in this context:

Nervos CKB 的经济模型专门用于保存资产价值和各种类型的数据。让我们回顾 3 个重要的经济模型设计目标,并在此背景下检查我们的设计:

  • How can the economic model ensure the security of the protocol?
  • How can the economic model ensure long term sustainability of the protocol?
  • How can the economic model align the objectives of different actors to grow the value of the protocol network?
  • 经济模型如何确保协议的安全性?
  • 经济模式如何确保协议的长期可持续性?
  • 经济模型如何让不同参与者拥有共同的目标,以促进整个网络的价值?

7.1 协议的安全性和可持续性

The main design choices we made to ensure security of the Nervos CKB as a “Store of Assets” protocol are:

  • Our native tokens represent claim to capacity in the state storage. This means the demand to holding assets on the platform directly puts demand on owning the native tokens. This creates an effective value capture mechanism into the native tokens from the assets they preserve. This is the only sustainable way that a “Store of Assets” platform can grow its security budget over time, instead of entirely basing it on speculation and altruism.
  • The secondary issuance makes sure miner compensation is predictable and based on preservation demand instead of transactional demand. It also eliminates potential incentive incompatibility of the Nakamoto Consensus nodes after block reward stops. The NervosDAO serves as the counter-force to the inflationary effects of secondary issuance, to ensure long term token holders are not diluted by this issuance.

我们为了确保 Nervos CKB 成为「资产存储」协议并保证安全性而做出主要的设计选择是:

  • 我们的原生代币代表了对状态存储的空间。这意味着如果想在平台上持有资产,同时也要求拥有原生代币。这代表了在平台上持有资产等于创造了对原生代币的需求,从而创建了一个有效的值捕获机制到原生代币中。这是「资产存储」平台随着时间的推移,可以持续增加安全预算的唯一方式,而不是基于投机和利他主义。
  • 二次发行确保对矿工的补偿是可预测的,并且基于保存价值的需求而不是可交易的需求。它还消除了出块奖励停止后如中本聪协议的共识节点,存在的激励矛盾问题。 NervosDAO 是「二级发行」所导致通胀效应的反制力量,以确保长期持有代币的人不会因为「二级发行」而被稀释。

For a purpose of keeping the network decentralized and censorship resistant, we believe it’s important to limit the resource requirements of consensus and full nodes. We protect the operating cost of nodes by regulating the throughput of computation and bandwidth, similar to how it’s accomplished with Bitcoin and Ethereum. We regulate the state storage with a combination of a “cap and trade” pricing scheme and opportunity cost based cost model for storage users.

为了保持网络的去中心化和抗审查能力,我们认为降低参与共识以及成为主节点所需要的资源门槛是非常重要的。我们通过调节计算和带宽的吞吐量来保护节点的运营成本,类似于比特币和以太坊的实现方式。我们透过「总量管制」的定价框架,与基于存储用户的成本模型的机会成本这两种方式,来管制了状态存储。 

7.2 让网络中每一类参与者的利益一致

In a typical smart contract platform, participants of the network have different interests - users want cheaper transactions, developers want adoption of their applications, miners want higher income, and holders want appreciation of their tokens. Those interests are not well aligned, and oftentimes in conflict - for example, more adoption won’t give cheaper transactions (they’ll be more expensive as more demand is put on the blockchain); cheaper transactions won’t give more income to the miners; higher token price won’t help with transaction cost (the opposite could happen if users don’t adjust their local transaction fee setting). Decentralized computation platforms provide value through processing transactions. The price of their tokens doesn’t materially change the intrinsic value of the network. For example, Ether’s price doubling doesn’t increase or decrease Ethereum’s intrinsic value as a decentralized computation platform. Assuming the gas price doesn’t change, a user can accomplish the same task with the same cost on the network. This makes token holders of Ethereum only take the role of an investor, instead of active contributors.

在典型的智能合约平台中,网络的参与者有不同的意图 - 用户希望更便宜的交易手续费,开发人员希望他们的 App 被使用,矿工希望获得更高的收入,持有者希望他们的代币增值。每一类的参与者的利益并不一样,而且经常发生矛盾 - 例如,更多的 App 使用不会给予让交易手续费更便宜(随着对区块链的需求增加,它们还会更加昂贵);较便宜的交易不会给矿工带来更多收入;较高的代币价格将无助于交易成本(如果用户不调整其本地交易费用设置,则可能发生相反的情况)。去中心化计算平台通过处理交易提供价值。他们的代币价格并没有实质性地改变网络的内在价值。例如以太坊作为去中心计算平台,价格的增加或减少并不会影响代币的内在价值。假设 gasPrice 没有变化,用户可以在网络上以相同的成本完成相同的任务。这使得以太坊的代币持有者只扮演了投资者的角色,而不是积极的贡献者。

In the Nervos CKB, Store of Assets users want security of their assets; developers want more adoption, reflected in more assets preserved; miners want higher income and token holders want price appreciation of their tokens. Higher token price supports everyone’s objective - the network would be more secure, miners get higher income, and token holders get better return. Aligning all participants’ incentives allows the network to best harness network effects to grow its intrinsic value. It also produces a more cohesive community and makes the system less prune to governance challenges.

在 Nervos CKB 中,资产存储用户希望其资产安全;开发者希望 App 更多的被使用,反映在更多的资产价值保存;矿工希望获得更高的收入,而代币持有者希望他们的代币价格升值。更高的代币价格支持每个人的利益 - 网络将更安全,矿工获得更高的收入,并且代币持有者获得更好的回报。将所有参与者的激励措施对齐,使网络能够最好地利用网络效应来增强其内在价值。它还产生了一个更具凝聚力的社区,使得该系统面临更少的治理挑战。

7.3 引导网络效应和网络增长

As the network grows to secure more assets and common knowledge, more native tokens of the Nervos CKB are going to become occupied. This accrues value to the native tokens by reducing circulating supply and providing positive support to the market price of the tokens. The higher price and increased share of secondary issuance motivate miners to expand operations and make the network more secure, increasing the intrinsic value of the network and the native tokens, attracting more and higher value preservation usage.

随着网络的发展得以保护更多的资产和共同知识,更多的 Nervos CKB 原生代币所对应的空间将被占用。这减少了流通量与供应量并同时提供原生代币的市场价格支撑,将会逐渐累积 CKB 的价值。更高的代币价格,以及增加的二次发行份额将可以激励矿工扩大规模并使得网络更加安全,也同时增加了整个网络和原生代币的内在价值,吸引更多和更高价值的资产存储用例。

The pro-cyclical loop of the network’s adoption and network’s intrinsic value provides a powerful growth engine for the network. Together with how the network’s value accrues to the native tokens and gets captured by long term holders, it makes the network’s native token an excellent candidate for store of value. Compared to Bitcoin as a monetary store of value, the Nervos CKB is similarly designed to be secure and long term decentralized. We believe Nervos CKB has a more balanced and sustainable economic model than Bitcoin, and also comes with intrinsic utility of securing crypto-assets and common knowledge.

网络采用的顺向循环和网络的内在价值为其本身提供了强大的增长引擎。连同网络如何逐渐累积价值,到原生代币如何被长期持有者捕获,都使得网络中的原生代币成为价值存储的绝佳候选者。与比特币作为货币存储价值相比,Nervos CKB 同样设计为安全且长期去中心化的。我们认为 Nervos CKB 拥有比比特币更加平衡和可持续的经济模型,并且还具有保护加密资产及数据的功用。

7.4 开发者在「一级资产」平台中的成本

In Ethereum, the top level abstraction is its accounts. Assets are expressed as state owned by smart contract accounts. In the Nervos CKB, assets are the first class abstraction with cells, where ownership is expressed with the lock script of a transaction output, a concept known as “First-Class Assets”. In other words, just like Bitcoin, assets in the Common Knowledge Base are owned by users directly instead of being kept custody in a smart contract.

在以太坊中,顶层的抽象是其帐户。智能合约账户拥有资产所代表的状态。在 Nervos CKB 中,资产是 Cell 的顶层的抽象,其中所有权是交易输出的锁定脚本来表示,这个概念称为「第一级资产」。换句话说,就像比特币一样,CKB 中的资产由用户直接拥有,而不是在智能合约中被保管。

The “First Class Asset” design allows the state storage cost of owning assets put not on developers, but on individual users. For example, a developer could create a User Defined Token with 400 bytes of code as validation rules, and every record of asset ownership would take 64 bytes. Even if the assets were to have 10,000 owners, the developer would still only need to use 400 CK Bytes.

「第一级资产」的设计允许开发者可以不用拥有资产,以及负担状态存储的成本,而是可以由其他独立的用户承担。举个例子,开发人员创建了一个用户自定义代币的验证规则,使用了 400 CK Bytes 的代码,同時每个资产所有权的记录都将占用 64 个字节。即使资产拥有 10,000 个所有者,开发人员仍然只需要使用 400 CK Bytes。

For developers, we expect the capital cost of building projects on the CKB is moderate even in a scenario that the price of the native tokens were to go up degrees of magnitude higher. For users, the cost of the 64 CK Bytes to own an asset on the Nervos CKB would also be trivial for a long time even in the most aggressive adoption assumption of the platform.

对于开发者而言,我们预计即使在原生代币的价格上升幅度较大的情况下,在 CKB 上建设项目的成本也是适中的。对于用户来说,即使平台在被大幅度采用的假设下,64 CK Bytes 在 Nervos CKB 上的拥有成本也很低。

In the future where those cost were to become meaningfully expensive, it’s always possible for developers to rely on lending to bootstrap their projects, and for users to move their assets off the Common Knowledge Base on to other transaction blockchains in the Nervos Network if they’re willing to take the corresponding trade-offs. Please see the “Nervos Network” section for more details.

在未来这些开发成本变得非常昂贵的情况下,开发者仍然可以依靠租赁来继续他们的项目,如果他们愿意采取对应的取舍,用户可以将他们的资产从 CKB 转移到 Nervos Network 中的其他交易区块链。相关信息请参考「7.6 Nervos Network」部分。

7.5 租赁

Even Nervos CKB will support native token lending to improve the liquidity of the CK Bytes, thanks to the programming ability provided by CKB-VM and the Cell model. Since the utility of the native token is realized through possession instead of transactions, it’s possible to have risk-free un-collateralized lending for CK Bytes locked for known duration of time. Entrepreneurs can borrow the CK Bytes they need with much lower capital cost for a period such as 6 months to work on prototypes and prove their business model. Long term users can lend out their tokens to earn extra income.

实际上 Nervos CKB 也将支持原生代币的租赁,以改善 CK Bytes 的流动性,这归功于 CKB-VM 和 Cell 模型提供的编程能力。由于原生代币的功能是通过空间占用而不是交易来实现的,因此可以在已知的一定时间内锁定 CK Bytes 进行无风险的无担保借贷。开发者可以在 6 个月的时间内以较低的资金成本借入他们需要的 CK Bytes 来处理产品原型并证明他们的商业模式。长期的代币持有者也可以出租他们的代币来赚取额外收入。

The effective interest rate of lending is determined by the market supply and demand, but the current state of token utilization also plays a big role. Higher utilization of the available global state means less tokens can be made available for lending. This makes the lending interest higher, and makes it more attractive to release state and lock tokens in the NervosDAO to earn income. This serves the purpose to help reduce the global state; lower utilization of the available state means more tokens can be lent out. This makes the lending interest rate lower to encourage adoption.

租赁的实际利率由市场供求决定,但代币的占用状况也有著重要的影响。如果全球状态利用率高,代表可用于贷款的代币就更少了。这将使得贷款利息更高,并且使得在 NervosDAO 合约中锁定状态,以获得收入更具吸引力。这有助于减少全球状态。而较低的全球状态利用率代表着有更多的代币可以出租。这将使得贷款利率降低以鼓励使用。

7.6 Nervos Network

The Nervos CKB is the base layer of the Nervos Network with the highest security, decentralization, transaction cost and state storage cost. Just like how Bitcoin and Ethereum could scale off-chain with lightening network and plasma solutions, Nervos CKB also embraces off-chain scaling solutions and allow users to preserve and transact assets off-chain. When using off-chain solutions, users and developers can choose their own trade-offs between cost, security, latency and liveness properties.

Nervos CKB 是 Nervos Network 的基础层,具有最高的安全性,去中心化,交易成本和状态存储成本。就像比特币和以太坊可以通过 lightening network 和 plasma 来进行链下的扩容方案,Nervos CKB 也采用了链下扩容解决方案,并允许用户在链下保存和交易资产。当使用链下解决方案时,用户和开发者可以在成本,安全性,延迟和活性之间做出权衡。

Owning and transacting assets on the Nervos CKB come with the highest capital and transaction cost, but is also the most secure. It’s best suited for high value assets and long term asset preservation; Layer 2 solutions can provide scaling for both transaction throughput and state storage, but they would come with either weakened security assumptions or mandate extra steps of repudiation, and often require participants to be online within a time window. If both are acceptable (likely for owning and transacting low value assets for short duration), the Nervos CKB can be used as security anchor to other transaction blockchains, to effectively magnify both its transaction and state storage capacities.

在 Nervos CKB 上拥有资产和交易资产需要最高的资本和交易成本,但也是最安全的。它最适合高价值资产和长期资产保值的用途。第 2 层解决方案可以为交易吞吐量和状态存储提供扩展,但它们会带有较弱的安全性证明,或强制要求额外的步骤,而且通常会要求参与者在一定的时间范围内在线。如果两者都可以接受(可能用于短期拥有和交易低价值资产),Nervos CKB 可以被用作其他交易区块链的安全之锚,以有效地放大其交易量和状态存储空间。

If operators of transaction blockchains don’t want to introduce extra security assumptions, they can mandate that high value assets to be issued on the CKB, and low value assets to be issued on transactional blockchains. Then they can use CK Bytes on the CKB to store periodic block commits, challenges and proofs from the transactional blockchains - critical common knowledge for secure off-chain transaction repudiation. If a transaction chain doesn’t mind introducing extra layer of security assumption with a committee-based consensus protocol, they could also have their validators bond CK Bytes on the CKB to explicitly adjust security parameters.

如果交易区块链的系统不想引入额外的安全证明,他们可以在 CKB 上抵押高价值的资产,并在交易区块链上发行低价值资产。然后,他们可以在 CKB 上使用 CK Bytes 来存储周期性的区块提交,这是交易区块链的挑战和证明 - 这是链下交易安全的关键常识。如果交易链不介意使用基于委员会的共识协议引入额外的安全性证明层,他们也可以让他们的验证节点在 CKB 上绑定 CK Bytes 以明确地调整安全的参数。

8. 代币经济学的应用

The economic model of the Nervos CKB provides building blocks that application developers can use directly as part of their own economic model. We’ll list subscriptions and liquidity income as two such possible building blocks.

Nervos CKB 的经济模型提供了 app 开发人员可以直接使用的模组来作为他们自己的经济模型的一部分。我们将订阅和流动性收入列为两个可能的模组。

  • Subscriptions
  • 订阅模型

Recurring payment or subscription is a typical economic model for services offered on the blockchain that span over some duration of time. One such example is the off-chain transaction monitoring service that’s often needed for layer 2 solutions. On the Nervos CKB, duration based services can ask their users to lock certain amount of native tokens in the NervosDAO and designate the service providers as the beneficiaries of the generated interest income in a subscription based model. Users can stop using the services by withdrawing their tokens from the NervosDAO.

很长一段时间,经常性支付或订阅是区块链上提供服务的典型经济模型。这边有一个例子是第 2 层解决方案经常需要离线交易的监控服务。基于 Nervos CKB 的订阅模型上,基于一定时间内的服务可以要求其用户在 NervosDAO 中锁定一定数量的原生代币,并将服务提供商指定为利息收入的受益者。用户可以通过从 NervosDAO 撤回其代币来停止使用这些服务。

In fact, Store of Assets users that occupy global state can be seen as paying an ongoing subscription metered by the size of their state, and the beneficiaries are the miners that provide the security service.

实际上,占用全球状态的资产存储用户可以被视为根据其状态的规模支付持续订阅的费用,受益人是提供安全服务的矿工。

  • Liquidity Income
  • 流动性收入模型

In a Plasma like layer 2 solution, a typical pattern is that users would deposit native tokens in a smart contract on the layer 1 blockchain in exchange for transaction tokens on the layer 2. A layer 2 operator with sufficient reputation can have users commit to fixed duration deposits, and then use such deposits to provide liquidity to the lending market and earn income. This gives operators of layer 2 solutions an additional revenue stream on top of the fees collected on layer 2.

在类似于 Plasma 的第 2 层解决方案中,典型的模式是用户将原生代币抵押在第 1 层区块链的智能合约中以换取第 2 层上的交易代币。具有足够信誉的第 2 层运营商可以让用户提交固定时限内的抵押,然后使用这些抵押资产做为贷款,为市场提供流动性并赚取收入。这为第 2 层解决方案的运营商在第 2 层收取的费用之外,提供了额外的收入。

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